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Abstract 
 
The paper endorses a dynamic rather than a static analysis of the EU at super-
systemic level of analysis. It sketches a toolkit to analyse the actors and contents of 
constitutional politics, exploiting the insights of the main grand theories, based on the 
interpretative scheme of crisis-initiative-leadership, and the distinction between unification, 
integration and construction. Applying this toolkit, a trend towards an increase of the EU 
federal features can be discerned. Eventually, to overcome the current crisis more steps in 
this direction are needed. 
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Introduction 
 
The EU is often considered a sui generis polity, and is recognised as a multi-level 
system of government. The European Parliament defined it a supranational democracy. It 
can be analysed from different perspectives, but essentially it challenges traditional notions 
of modern politics associated with the nation-state. In this paper I will argue that it may be 
reasonable to consider it as the laboratory of a new form of supranational federal 
democracy.  
To argue my case it is necessary to assess what is the EU in comparison with a 
federation. Such an assessment requires an historical and dynamic perspective, and not a 
static one, to assess if there are consistent trends in its development. I am inspired by an 
old academic debate on federal studies about the opportunity to focus on federal 
institutions from a legal and static perspective, or rather on federalising processes. Wheare's 
approach, systematised in his seminal work Federal government, was criticised for being too 
static - even if beside the actual design and functioning of federal government, it analysed 
also the reasons why a federal arrangement would be a suitable choice, and had a 
pioneering comparative perspective. Friedrich's classic Federalism in theory and practice moved 
the debate to a more dynamic conception of federalising processes. Elazar followed 
Friedrich's path, trying to propose a federalist paradigm throughout his works, and 
summarised in Exploring Federalism. However, his dynamism brought him too far, 
jeopardising the very basis of federal studies, as Elazar tended to consider any institutional 
settings between a unitary state and an international organization within federal 
arrangements. This way he blurred together the classic distinction between federation and 
confederation, which had been the basis of federal studies since the creation of the 
American federation and the publication of The Federalist Papers. Albertini's Il federalismo. 
Antologia e definizione, proposed a complex theory of federalism as an active political 
thought, combining a dynamic vision of federalising processes with a firm classic definition 
of the federal state institutions. 
A similar debate needs to take place with regards to the EU. Far too often after 
each new Treaty comes into force, a new wave of studies describes the new features of the 
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EU and often attempts to identify new trends and suggest that whole phases of the 
integration process are open or closed on the basis of that last step. Unfortunately, such 
analyses tend to last only until a new Treaty enters into forceI. Such attempts at drawing 
long-term conclusions from the analysis of relatively short-term developments are 
fashionable, because there is always a heated academic and public debate on the EU, but 
their short life suggests that they are methodologically weak. It is more sensible and fruitful 
to interpret the short-term developments in the light of a long-term analysis of the 
processII. To do that it is necessary to address the proper level of analysis, and to combine 
the most fruitful insights of the main integration theories, which I will do in the first 
section. 
I will then summarise the whole development of the European integration process 
to identify the main institutional trends. Such an analysis will also highlight the relevance of 
classical categories such as federation and confederation. I will suggest that there is a rather 
consistent trend towards an expansion of EU competences and towards strengthening 
supranational decision-making processes. In other words, I claim that while at any time 
from 1950 until today, a static view of the EU would suggest that it has both federal and 
confederal features, a dynamic view shows a significant increase of the former over the 
latter. On this basis I will discuss the current crisis and the possibility that it may trigger 
new steps forwards, contributing to the establishment of a new kind of supranational 
federal democracy. 
 
1. The theoretical toolkit for a long-term analysis of  the EU 
development 
 
Peterson (1995) suggests that the EU can be studied at three main levels of analysis: 
super-systemic, systemic and sub-systemic. History-making decisions, basically 
corresponding to constitutional politics, are his super-systemic level, on which so-called 
grand theories have focused. They can be broadly grouped into three families: the 
intergovernmentalist, the neo-functionalist, and the federalist traditionsIII (cfr. Rosamond 
2000). They differ with regards to the identification of the key players in the process; the 
motives (economic, political, ideological) of their choices; the relationship between 
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economic integration and the creation of supranational institutions and decision-making 
procedures; the dynamics of the process and the decision-making mechanisms that 
determine it; and the possible/desirable ultimate goal of integration. For different reasons 
and in different ways all have difficulties in explaining - not just foreseeing - the "time" of 
the various steps of European integration, which is a crucial element of the process. All 
traditions passed through phases of revision or spread according to the relative congruence 
with a certain stage of the process. It is not possible to analyse them in any detail here (see 
Castaldi 2005), but I will consider their different views about the main actors and their 
agenda setting power with regards to constitutional politics. This will necessarily include an 
examination of their explanatory capacity regarding the timing of constitutional politics. 
 
1.1. Identifying and analysing the actors of European constitutional politics 
 
The intergovernmental - or confederal or internationalist - school of thought 
identifies national governments as the key players that control the integration process. 
Constitutional politics revolved mainly around Treaty reforms that result from 
Intergovernmental Conferences. The dynamics of the intergovernmental bargaining is thus 
the key element to be analysed. Moravcsik’s sophisticated liberal intergovernmentalism (see 
especially 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1998) also considers the interaction with domestic 
constituencies and stakeholders as determinants of the national preferences that confront 
each other within the European intergovernmental bargain. Usually intergovernmentalism 
essentially discharges European institutions as main players in constitutional politics. 
However, against the initial assumption that member states would not to give up their 
sovereignty to supranational bodiesIV and integration may bring about at most a 
confederation, intergovernmentalist thought had then to explain the gradual but significant 
strengthening of the supra-national or federal features of the EU. Moravcsik deals elegantly 
with this problem suggesting that European institutions are instruments to ensure a correct 
implementation of the grand bargains that would otherwise not have been applied entirely 
by some member states because of their relative costs.  
The neo-functionalist strand initially interpreted European integration as a gradual 
dynamic process superseding states’ absolute sovereignty. Integration would eventually lead 
to political union under the leadership of technocratic elites heading supranational 
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institutions. The political entrepreneurial role of the European Commission as agenda 
setter, steering the integration process has been traditionally emphasized by neo-
functionalist scholarship. However, after the Empty Chair crisis a significant theoretical 
revision took place, acknowledging the significant role of national governments too. In the 
second 1968 edition of his classic The Uniting of Europe, Haas proposed a profound self-
questioning and criticism, acknowledging the central role of states and national 
governments, the limits of supranational technocratic elites, and especially the possibility 
that, instead of spill-over, other integrative or disintegrative dynamics could take place. On 
this basis, an extensive neo-functionalist literature highlighted the concept of spill-around, 
build-up, retrench, muddle-about, spill-back, encapsulate, each of which indicated a 
possible dynamic of strengthening or weakening of both institutional and decision-making 
mechanisms and the enlargement or reduction of the areas involved (see Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970 and 1971; Schmitter 1969 and 1971). The theory thus assumed a 
markedly analytical character, potentially able to describe any evolution of the process, but 
without developing a proper analysis of the factors that could lead to one or another 
scenario, and therefore remaining unable to predict the process future developments. 
Therefore by abandoning a progressive and optimistic vision of the process, and the 
ultimate goal of political unification, it also lost its capacity as a guide and drive for political 
action. 
The federalist tradition considered the integration process as an incomplete 
response to the crisis of the nation state, which would rather require the foundation of a 
European federal state through a constitutional process democratically involving European 
citizens. The role of personalities and movements in favour of European unity and the 
constituent potential of the European Parliament have been at the centre of much 
federalist literature.  
Each theory essentially stresses the role of one set of actors, among those actually 
involved at different times in constitutional politics. A further limitation common to all 
macro-theories, then largely filled by the European constitutionalism literature, is the 
systematic underestimation of the role of the Court of Justice in advancing the process. 
This is a structural but understandable limitation for the intergovernmental theories that 
focus on the Member states and their negotiations. Such an underestimation is less 
understandable for the neo-functionalist theories that, by stressing the importance of 
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creating supranational technocratic elites, could consider the Court, and also the 
Commission, as a supranational institution characterized by such distinctive features. Such 
an underestimation is indeed strange for the federalist theories given the role played by the 
Supreme Court in developing the powers of the U.S. federal government, and Hamilton’s 
observations about the crucial role of the judiciary within a federation. 
However, within the federalist tradition, some authors developed a more 
sophisticated view of the dynamic of constitutional politics, of the role of the various 
actors and of its timing. This view was theoretically developed by Mario Albertini, also on 
the basis of an analysis of Spinelli’s own activity, and focused on three elements: crisis, 
initiative, leadership. It was reached investigating why in certain moments the federalist 
theses had achieved widespread success in the political class, while in other cases they 
remained on the margins of public debate and not included in the official political agenda. 
It was necessary to identify the mechanisms and actors that marked time in the process of 
European unification. Experience showed that the supranational institutions, national 
governments, European and federalist personalities and movements had all played an 
important role in some specific moments, but not in others. It was thus necessary to 
conceptualize their interaction to understand the dynamics of the process and when it 
provides windows of opportunity for federalist proposals. This requires going beyond the 
traditional formulations of the various theories, including the federalist one. The result of 
this theoretical effort was a tripartite scheme focused on the concepts of crisis, leadership 
and initiative, which helps analyse the dynamic of the unification process.  
The crisis refers to the acute social perception of a problem which has a 
supranational character and cannot thus be structurally solved at national level. When such 
a crisis arises, it is possible for new initiatives to transfer competences or powers to 
European level to solve the crisis - often promoted by pro-European figures, organizations, 
etc. - to find a favourable audience within the political class and the publicV. Only if a 
European leadership - which can be provided by a national government, usually a Prime 
Minister or a foreign minister, of by a European institution - takes the initiative upon itself 
can it enter the official political agenda, and eventually, after a usually complex negotiation, 
be agreed upon in its main tenets if not completelyVI.  
I would like to stress that there is no inevitability implied by this scheme. There 
could have been, and in fact there were, several crises on which no effective initiative to 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
133 
strengthen European integration was developed, or which did not find a suitable European 
leadership to put it on the agenda. The 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods systems 
brought about a vast debate on monetary union culminated with the Werner Plan to 
establish a monetary union by 1980VII. The 1973 Oil Shock contributed to the demise of 
the Plan, and the only step forward on the monetary field was the establishment of the 
European Monetary System in 1979.  
Furthermore, it is possible that the acute social perception of a crisis fades away, or 
that the European leadership collapses or is unable to gather the necessary consensus for 
the initiative to be approved. For example the Korean war and the following American 
demand to rearm West Germany brought about Monnet's initiative of a European Defence 
Community that was taken up by a European leadership provided by the French Pleven 
Governments. Spinelli seized the opportunity to suggest that a European army without a 
European government would undermine democracy throughout Europe, and De Gasperi 
provided a European leadership which brought to the EDC Treaty art. 38, and to the 
subsequent establishing of the Ad Hoc Assembly to draft a Treaty/Constitution for a 
European Political CommunityVIII. The end of the Korean War, Stalin's death, the collapse 
of the Pleven and De Gasperi governments before the whole decision making procedure 
was completed eventually contributed to the fall of the EDC at the French National 
Assembly on a procedural vote thanks to the alliance between Gaullists and communists.  
Also the tension and contradictions, or the progressive application, of the 
European norms and institutions can occasionally play the role of the crisis, i.e. of windows 
of opportunities or catalysts for debates and possibly decisions on the competence and/or 
powers to the European level. For example the end of the transitory period of the 
Common Market with the foreseen introduction of QMV, coupled by the Hallstein 
Commission's proposal, led to the Empty Chair Crisis and eventually the Luxembourg 
Compromise. This shows that this theoretical scheme is not teleological and can be useful 
to explain the timing and the agenda setting of European constitutional politics, both with 
regards to its success as much as its setbacks.   
Another useful example to grasp the significance of the scheme is the second Iraqi 
war during the Convention. This divided the member states governments, with some of 
them siding with the US notwithstanding Eurobarometer suggesting that 80% of European 
citizens, and anyway a majority of them in each and every European country, opposed the 
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war. A military crisis brought about an initiative on military issues: France, Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg proposed and obtained the inclusion of the provisions about 
permanent structured cooperation on defence in the Constitutional Treaty, and then in the 
Lisbon Treaties. The changes in the international environment and in the national 
governments explain why those provisions have not been employed so far. Similarly the 
dramatic international change in 1989 led not only to the IGC on economic and monetary 
union but also an IGC on political union. The first produced the three stage plan to reach 
the Monetary Union which eventually resulted in the Euro. The second essentially failed, 
and brought to the formal attribution to the EU of some concurrent competences - the 
second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty - with basically no powers and effective 
institutional mechanisms to handle them. 
 These examples suggest that the crisis alone does not necessary bring steps 
forward. The crisis-initiative-leadership scheme helps to identify the relevant actors of 
constitutional politics at different times, and to analyse the timing and process of 
constitutional politics agenda setting. The other two crucial elements to be considered are 
the content of constitutional politics and some of its characteristic dynamics. Furthermore, 
there can be structural problems that only occasionally turn into a socially perceived crisis. 
Nonetheless, their underlying persistence can sustain a certain phase of the unification 
process and can be the basis of the activities of the federalist personalities and 
organizations. The contradiction of a monetary union not accompanied by an economic 
and fiscal one, has been the basis of federalist campaigning for a European constitution 
since 1992. The "asymmetry" of the planned EMU and the enlargement played a major 
role in the 2000s, and in the set up of the Convention, even if the Constitutional Treaty fell 
short of establishing a European economic government while the Penelope Project by the 
European Commission pointed in that direction.  
 
1.2. The content and dynamics of European constitutional politics 
 
In all multi-level systems of government – especially in federations, that are the 
democratic state-form of such systems – constitutional politics deals mainly with two 
issues: the competences of the different levels of government, and the powers and 
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decision-making procedures related to those competences. This fundamental recognition is 
shared by all main theories, even if adopting different words and stressing one element 
more than another as determining the dynamics of the whole process. 
 Albertini distinguishes construction, integration and unificationIX. The concept of 
"unification" refers specifically to the political process related to the progressive 
overcoming of absolute national and exclusive sovereignty, through its transfer or pooling 
with regard to a defined and limited number of issues at European level. This is the general 
concept to capture the historical significance (from a long-term perspective) of what is 
usually called European integration. Unification, therefore, includes both the gradualist 
phase and the possible and eventual decision to set up a European federal state. The 
historical significance of the process was the unification of several states and is based on 
two aspects: the integration of competences and the construction of supranational 
institutions. The term "integration", whose semantic connotation refers to something 
technocratic should be used instead to focus on the competences attributed at European 
level, which historically have been accumulated mainly through a process of economic 
integration along an essentially neo-functionalist pathX. The term "construction" indicates 
the process of institution building in Europe, which can be analyzed by using constitutional 
or federal criteria. Its semantic connotation refers to the element of planning and the 
political will necessary to "build" Europe, i.e. its institutions and decision-making 
mechanisms, or its powers. 
To put it in a nutshell, the process of unification was conceived for the function of 
transferring competences from national to European level with the consequent 
implementation of European policies (integration) and the building of institutions and 
decision-making mechanisms to manage these responsibilities (construction). The decision 
to create the common market, and then the common agricultural policy, the single market, 
the single currency, the area of internal freedom provided by the Treaty of Schengen, are all 
examples of integration. The direct election and then the extension of the powers of the 
European Parliament, the introduction and then the extension of qualified majority voting 
in the Council, the creation of the European Central Bank, and other aspects related to 
decision-making and to the  institutional structure of the Union are examples of 
institutional construction. 
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Similarly the neo-functionalist revision which followed the Empty chair crisis 
identified several possible dynamics to account for a strengthening or weakening of both 
institutional and decision-making mechanisms and the enlargement or reduction of the 
areas involved (see Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 and 1971; Schmitter 1969 and 1971). 
Moravcsik holds a very similar view, by distinguishing between the “substantive 
agreement” - reached in one of the “grand bargains” characterizing the stages of the 
process - on economic issues (policies, funding, etc.) and the following “institutional 
choices”. 
Different theories held different views about the dynamics of constitutional politics 
and of its two main contents: competences and institutions, integration and construction. 
Moravcsik suggests that “institutional choice” is always subordinate and functional 
to the previous and essential “substantive agreement” - reached in one of the “grand 
bargains” characterizing the stages of the process - on economic issues (policies, funding, 
etc.). This is a necessary stand for liberal intergovernmentalism which considers European 
institutions merely as an instrument for the correct enforcement of the bargains. Moravcsik 
gives priority to integration, the establishment of policies and the transfer of expertise and 
possibly resources, rather than to selected institutional choices, although acknowledging 
that the element of novelty characterizing the Community and then the Union was its own 
institutional framework.  
On the contrary, Albertini argues that the level of construction is the key variable to 
assess the unification process, because the achievement of certain objectives, including the 
economic ones, is not possible without a sufficiently democratic and efficient institutional 
framework. This idea fits with the distinction between “positive” and “negative” 
integration (see Pinder and Pryce 1969; and then Pinder 1989) developed to explain the 
initial success of the EEC in establishing a Common Market by eliminating obstacles, and 
its failure to develop a single market until the SEA introduced QMV, which was initially 
foreseen at the end of the transitional period, and which contributed to the Empty chair 
crisisXI. 
Albertini also developed a normative vision of this interaction, bridging Monnet 
and Spinelli’s initial positions, and eventually theorizing constitutional gradualism, 
summarised by the program: European election, European currency, European 
government (see Albertini 1966, 1969, 1971, 1976, 1979, now all in 1999b; and 1968, now 
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in 1999a; see also Pinder 1985). He took note of the gradual nature of the process, while 
stressing the need for a democratic constituent transition to reach political unification, and 
focused on the conditions for the possibility of such a constituent process. It could only 
begin when Europe had achieved significant powers that affected citizens’ lives, while its 
institutional structures and decision-making procedures were not yet fully democratic, but 
only potentially democratic. The direct election of the European Parliament - substantially 
powerless at that time - and the creation of a single currency were identified as the key 
partial goals of the process. Together they could lead to the contradiction of a European 
power without a European democratic government. This could be the basis for a 
potentially successfully struggle to start a constitutional process designed to create a federal 
constitution and government. Indeed the constitutional language, dismissed with the fall of 
the European Defence Community Treaty in 1954, came back with the Convention and 
the Constitutional Treaty, when those two intermediate goals had both been reached. 
I suggest that there is a continuous and complex interaction between integration 
and construction, and that none of them can be considered as a dependent variable of the 
other (see also Montani 2008). The fact that sufficiently strong and democratically 
legitimised mechanisms for decision-making institutions are necessary in order to achieve 
shared goals has been historically proven: for example the introduction of majority voting 
in the Council, provided by the Single European Act of 1986 only with regard to the 
creation of the single market, was clearly linked to the objective of establishing the Single 
market by 1992. This required the adoption of over three hundred directives, impossible to 
be achieved unanimously. Nonetheless, most deliberations were then passed unanimously, 
because when QMV applies, all states have an incentive to cooperate in drafting the bill, 
and not to be outvoted.  On the other hand, when unanimity is required, there is little 
incentive for compromise since each government knows it can block any decision that 
does not satisfy its demands. 
At the same time, the history of the process also shows the opposite case, namely 
aspects of the institutional construction that have triggered other changes both at the level 
of construction and integration. Two examples are particularly relevant. The creation of the 
Court of Justice whose power is binding has led to an expansion of Community 
competences and powers through the jurisprudential affirmation of the principles of 
implied powers and of the primacy and direct applicability of the EU rulesXII. Similarly, the 
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direct election of the European Parliament has triggered a process of continuous and 
progressive increase in Parliament’s powers during all subsequent amending of Treaties. 
Moreover, the initiative of Parliament with the approval in 1984 of the draft Treaty of 
European Union, also known as Spinelli Project, favoured the re-launch of the integration 
process through the Single European Act transposing some of the content of that project, 
especially with regard to the aim of the single market, as well as other parts that have been 
recovered by subsequent treaties (see Lodge 1984 and 1986). 
The interaction between construction and integration takes time. They are like two 
columns on which unification is based. If they are not developed symmetrically a dynamic 
tension arises. But improvements can start on each of them first. This distinction also helps 
to focus on the longer term, generally progressive but not linear, trend of the unification 
process. Generally, when a new competence is attributed at European level – i.e. a new 
step of integration is made – it is handled through essentially intergovernmental 
procedures. Only when a positive result is achieved, but not all potential advantages are 
achieved due to the constraints of unanimity, does a communitarization of the relevant 
decision-making procedure take place.  
The 1957 Rome Treaty provided for a transitional period in which unanimity 
applied, before establishing QMV. The Empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg 
compromise prevented this, and the establishment of a complete European market had to 
wait until 1992, after QMV was introduced in 1986. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty provided 
for the creation of the monetary union, and for the first time attributed to the EU new 
competences in the fields of foreign policy and justice and home affairs – the so-called 
second and third pillars – on strictly intergovernmental terms. Many scholars, especially 
intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists, suggested that the Treaty checked the 
progress of supranationality, reinforcing the intergovernmental character of the EU. This 
was a short-term and short-sighted view, disconfirmed by the fact that all subsequent 
treaties up to Lisbon have abolished the three-pillar structure, and progressively if not 
completely extended the use of QMV, the co-decision procedure of the Parliament, the 
role of the Commission and the judicial role of the Court of Justice also in these fields. I 
have already summarised the impact of the Court of Justice and of the direct election of 
the Parliament in triggering new powers and competences at European level.  
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All this shows the usefulness of the distinction between integration and 
construction within the unification process. A significant increase in competences or power 
alone is likely to result in an increase in the other elements too. Historical record suggests 
that none of them can be considered as a variable dependent on the other, but that 
adequate attention must be paid to their interaction.  
 
To project a long-term view onto the process I have so far developed a theoretical 
toolkit based on two analytical schemes. The first analyses the timing of the agenda setting 
of constitutional politics and the relevant actors through the concepts of crisis, initiative 
and leadership. The second focuses on the content of constitutional politics distinguishing 
between unification, integration and construction and investigating their interaction, 
without giving analytical preference to any of them. I will now employ this theoretical 
toolkit to analyse the European unification process and assess if there are significant and 
consistent trends that can project some light on the definition of the EU.  
 
 
2. The EU: a federation in the making? 
 
 For decades the literature has dealt with the definition of the EU, exploiting the 
federal versus confederal models or ideal types. And any sensible author has invariably 
concluded that, since 1950, the European institutional setting has been characterised by 
both federal and confederal elements. Many scholars have thus suggested abandoning the 
federal and confederal models altogether, as the EU would constitute a hybrid model. This 
argument is basically flawed as it stems from a static view of the EU, rather than from a 
dynamic one.  
 The unitary state, the federal state and the confederal organization represent 
models because each of them historically existed and manifested a reasonable degree of 
stability. They are models because they seem to represent a reasonable institutional 
crystallization of certain types of social preferences with regards the attribution of ultimate 
decision-making power about fundamental social issues. Between these models there can 
be several kinds of organizations with characteristics of two models, but they would 
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probably be institutionally unstable. An inherent tension would push for institutional 
reform towards one of the models. The EU perfectly fits this option. The very fact that its 
institutional transformation – in terms of competences and powers - is the core of the 
unification process, suggests that it cannot be taken as an institutional model. If and when 
it will achieve a reasonable institutional stability, keeping federal and confederal features, it 
may be proposed as a new institutional model or ideal.  
From the Schuman Declaration of the 9th May 1950 up to the Lisbon Treaties, 
there has been a relatively consistent trend towards the increase of European competences 
and/or powers. The transfer of competences and powers has not always proceeded at the 
same pace. Often a transfer of competences, to be handled in a purely or mainly 
intergovernmental manner, preceded the actual transfer of powers and/or the set up of 
supranational decision-making procedures with regards to those competences. The 
opposite was also true: the direct election of the European Parliament preceded the 
achievement of real powers by the Parliament with regards to the various European 
competences. There are two major exceptions to this trend, and two mixed ones, more 
difficult to be assessed properly 
The European Coal and Steel Community was created with limited competences 
and extensive powers on those competences, mainly vested in the High Authority - among 
them legal personality, fiscal powers with regards to coal and steel, and the possibility to 
contract debts. The Korean war and the American request for German rearmament 
resulted in the proposal for the European Defence Community, and to the linked Ad Hoc 
Assembly and European Political Community Draft Treaty. Their collapse was the first 
major exception to the trend of increasing European competences and/or powers. 
However, it should be observed, that this prevented a new transfer of competences and 
power, but did not unravel anything that had been already achieved.  
The 1957 Rome Treaties is usually considered a great success. However, it can be 
considered a mixed case. Indeed, they provided a significant increase in competences, thus 
strengthening integration. At the same time they granted more limited powers than the 
ECSC had done for handling those competences. The new Communities in particular were 
not assigned a legal personality, and the supranational executive, the High Authority, was 
now called Commission, and was not granted the fiscal and borrowing capacity which 
characterized the ECSC. The end of the transitory period of the EEC - within which new 
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European policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy were created - the Hallstein 
proposals and the scheduled arrival of qualified majority voting provoked the Empty chair 
crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise. This essentially prevented the full application of 
the Rome Treaty and was the second major exception to the mentioned trend.  
In the meantime the European Court of Justice shaped the process through its 
sentences, establishing the European system as an autonomous legal order, the prevalence 
and direct effect of European norms, and later on the mutual recognition principle. Since 
then a significant and consistent trend can be discerned, punctuated by the creation of the 
European Council; the establishment of the European Monetary System; the direct election 
of the European Parliament; the Single European Act and the creation of the Single 
Market; the Maastricht Treaty, significantly expanding the European competences and 
setting the path towards monetary union, which brought to the creation of the European 
Central Bank and the Euro; the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties which provided for limited 
increases of European competences and for more supranational decision-making by 
strengthening Parliament and increasing the use of QMV.  
The collapse of the Constitutional Treaty was the second mixed case or the third 
possible exception. Its content has been almost completely incorporated into the Lisbon 
Treaties but purged of all constitutional language. It is still difficult to assess how this will 
impact on the process. It certainly provoked at least a significant loss of time and impetus. 
The Lisbon Treaties communitarised most competences granted at Maastricht, 
strengthened Parliament and the Commission by establishing a closer link between the two 
and by acknowledging their power to initiate the treaty amendment procedure, made the 
use of enhanced cooperation easier, and established the possibility for a group of countries 
to go forwards on military integration through the brand new permanent structured 
cooperation on defence and, by means of the passerelle clause, made it easier to pass to QMV 
as regards those competences where unanimity still applies. 
A dynamic analysis of the development of the EU indicates a relatively consistent 
trend of the strengthening of its federal features, punctuated by a number of significant 
institutional developments. The Court of Justice has essentially a federal character, and its 
jurisprudence – much like the early US Supreme Court – has significantly strengthened the 
federal character of the European legal order. The direct election of the European 
Parliament and its gradual but continuous increase of powers, accompanied by the 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
142 
introduction and progressive expansion of QMV, up to the introduction of the double 
majority principle, also strengthened the federal nature of the EU. The European Central 
Bank and the Euro are clearly federal institutions. The expansion of the Union 
competences to comprise essentially all those characteristic of federal states, at least in a 
concurrent form, and the gradual but continuous communitarization of the relative 
decision-making procedures, also points in this direction.  
 There were other institutional developments less amenable to a clear classification 
between the classic federal vs. confederal model. The European Council was initially 
established on the basis of Monnet’ proposal to create a European provisional government 
on an intergovernmental basis as a step towards a proper European democratic 
government. The Lisbon treaty provides for the election of the Commission by Parliament 
when proposed by the Council, taking into account the results of the European election. 
Potentially, the Council may assume the character of a collective presidency, with a power 
similar to that recognized in countries like Italy and Germany for the President. At the 
same time, the creation of the permanent president of the Council pushes towards a dual 
executive, made up of the Commission and the European Council. However, the 
possibility – not excluded by the Treaties – of merging the position of President of the 
Commission and of the European Council, may trigger a different dynamic.  
Recalling the whole EU development it is hardly surprising that, within comparative 
law and politics, the EU has started to be systematically compared with federal politiesXIII. 
Indeed, the EU is not (yet?) a fully-fledged federation. But it resembles a federation more 
than anything else (Dosenrode 2007). This was not the case at the beginning of the 
process. Therefore it may be reasonable to dynamically conceive the EU as a "federation in 
the making", as suggested long ago by federalist scholarsXIV. 
What is missing from the EU for it to look like a fully-fledged federation? There are 
only a few but important features lacking: the complete abolishment of unanimity, even as 
regards approval and ratification of Treaty/constitutional reforms, the budget, and security 
policies; and the attribution of fiscal powers and a full co-decision for the Parliament for 
defining revenue and all expenditures. It is possible to argue that two more elements are 
needed: a clear identification of the federal government with the Commission, rather than 
the current dual system based on the Commission and the European Council, and a 
significant federal competence with regards to the military and security issues.  
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However, the establishment of the Commission as a federal government may well 
be possible under the current institutional arrangements. It would be enough for the 
European parties to present a candidate and a program for the President of the 
Commission to politicize the European election and strengthen the Commission’s popular 
legitimacy and its role as a federal government. It would be politically impossible for the 
Council not to propose the candidate receiving most votes and able to form a majority 
coalition in the Parliament as President of the Commission. Furthermore, even with the 
current institutional setting it is possible to nominate the President of the Commission as 
President of the European Council too, creating de facto the President of the Union. 
Eventually, the direct election of a single President for the two posts could create a new 
form of dual executive with a strong legitimate head to ensure the coherence of the two 
bodies.  
As far as military issues are concerned - even if Riker was right in noticing that 
security concerns played an important if not decisive role in all federalising processes - 
considering that Europe does not face significant military threats, it may well be possible 
that such a competence remains a concurrent competence. Looking at the European 
unification history, it is possible to suggest that security was one of the last competences to 
be granted to the EU, and it will take some time to communitarise or federalize it.  
 
 
3. Overcoming the current crisis: towards a European 
supranational federal democracy? 
 
The long constitutional process that started at Laeken and concluded with the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaties has produced in the actors involved a sense of “fatigue”. 
Some of the leading European politicians have emphatically declared that the ‘Pandora’s 
box’ of institutional reform will not be re-opened for a long time to come. The Lisbon 
Treaties would thus be the last of the series opened by the Single European Act (SEA), and 
continued through Maastrict, Amsterdam, Nice, and the failed Constitutional Treaty. 
Indeed, the Lisbon Treaties were written as if they had to last for a long time. There is no 
evolutionary clause, unlike the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, which all 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
144 
acknowledged the need for a new reform within a certain time, or when the EU reached a 
certain number of member states, or to deal with the “leftovers” which the last Treaty had 
not been able to tackle. However, the agenda of constitutional politics is largely the result 
of external factors to which the main actors have to provide answers, and which can be 
observed through the conceptual scheme outlined before with regards to crisis, initiative 
and leadership. Furthermore, there are internal EU institutional dynamics that cannot be 
easily circumvented. 
This hybrid institutional setting which was supposed to become stable after Lisbon 
has been shaken by several tensions and structural crises which are triggering a new round 
of decisions in constitutional politics. It is now clear that the Lisbon Treaties did not equip 
the EU with adequate powers to cope with all these problems. The issues of competences 
and powers – the contents of constitutional politics – are coming to the fore again.  
The EU, and particularly the Eurozone, is now in the midst of a severe crisis, which 
has spurred a major debate on how to solve it, and resulted in several proposals and 
initiatives. Essentially, a new Treaty is in sight, and constitutional negotiations are open 
again. The current crisis is the result of two different crisesXV.  
The 2008 financial crisis which started in the US brought a significant slowdown of 
the world economy. The EU was unable to provide credible answers because the member 
states had to comply with the Stability Pact, and the EU budget is too small to provide a 
stimulus. The economic and financial crisis of 2008 thus hit Europe significantly. The 
limits of a situation characterized by a single market, a single currency and twenty-seven 
national economic and fiscal policies started to be socially perceived. Faced with the 
economic crisis, the EU, which is the world’s largest economy, has launched a 1.5% 
stimulus plan through the national governments. The US, with higher public debt and 
lower private saving, launched a 5.6% plan; and China a 7% plan. If national budgets must 
be kept under strict control to avoid “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies, the task of the 
economic re-launch will have to be dealt with collectively at European level, which requires 
a structural transformation of the European budget and of its revenues sources.  
The weak economic growth at a time of financial instability was followed by the 
Irish Government’s intervention to save its banking system and by the new Papandreu 
Government uncovering wide-scale fake data in the Greek budget of the previous 
government. These are two small countries at the periphery of Europe, which in 2008 
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made up about 7% of the Eurozone public debt, that started the sovereign debt crisis. A 
decisive move by the Eurozone could probably have calmed down the markets. But it did 
not come. Austerity measures were imposed all round. Economic downturn followed. The 
ability of those countries to repay their debt faced with spiking interest rates and recession 
further decreased. The sovereign debt crisis got worse and now involves Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, and has started approaching France.  
The sovereign debt crisis is putting the monetary union at risk and puts the issue of 
the economic and fiscal governance at the centre of the political agenda. The Council has 
discussed several proposals with an essentially intergovernmental character, up to the 
signing of the so-called Fiscal Compact. The Commission initially made relatively weak 
proposals to ensure a better coordination of national fiscal policies (“Reinforcing economic 
policy coordination” - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social 
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions of 12/5/2010) and only later on developed 
bolder proposals. The ECB, which felt most of the pressure from the market, was the first 
to explicitly demand more powers from the Commission and for new decision-making 
procedure to be agreed upon (“Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area”-  
10/6/2010) that were then also supported by the Commission. 
The establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility, the provision of a 
new permanent European Stability Mechanism, then anticipated by one year, and other 
such measures did not convince the markets. After about twenty European Council 
meetings aimed at saving the Euro and confirming the will to do "all that it takes" to save 
the monetary union, the crisis is still ravaging Europe and undermining growth throughout 
the world. Member states pledged around 5% of GDP to the EFSF over time. Had they 
done that at the beginning it would have almost completely covered the Irish and Greek 
debt, avoiding the spiking interest rates and the following worsening of the crisis. But fiscal 
indiscipline had to be punished. Essentially, the German government view that the crisis 
was due to lack of fiscal discipline is still prevalent. Unfortunately, it does not stand close 
scrutiny. The fundamental macroeconomic indicators in the Eurozone are much better 
than in the US and Japan in terms of public debt and deficit, of public reserves, and of 
private savings. The EU is the largest economy in the world and it has the best public 
finances among the most developed countries. What it lacks is a government. Nobody is in 
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charge. Therefore the EU was unable to intervene at the start of the crisis, and still now 
does not offer convincing answers to the markets. Essentially, the issue is that a single 
market of twenty seven countries, a single currency for seventeen countries, without a 
single fiscal and economic policy, does not stand up. 
The national governments have now decided to draft a new intergovernmental 
treaty to provide for semi-automatic sanctions for countries in breach of fiscal discipline 
and substantially curbing their fiscal sovereignty, putting their fiscal and budget decisions 
under substantial European control. This would be an enhanced Stability Pact rather than a 
proper fiscal union which is the declared aim.  
However, the Commission presented different documents about a European tax, 
and even Eurobonds, notwithstanding the first being opposed by the British and the 
second by the Germans. Eventually, especially on the first issue, and despite the British 
refusal to participate in the new intergovernmental treaty, an enhanced cooperation, or the 
inclusion in the new Treaty of the first proposal was agreed upon. And pressure is building 
on Germany to accept the creation of Eurobonds in return for the strengthening of the 
Stability Pact. 
 For a long time, the European Parliament was the weakest institution, but following 
its direct election it has acquired a strong legitimacy. Since then, the Parliament has 
continuously demanded and progressively achieved new powers. And it always made use of 
the new powers acquired. The Lisbon Treaties recognizes to the Parliament the power to 
initiate a Treaty Reform. This was precisely what it lacked at the time of the 1984 Spinelli 
Draft Treaty.  
The Parliament already started a political struggle about the long-term prospects of 
the European budget and the demand for own resources. The Parliament also proclaimed 
that it will propose an alternative plan to the intergovernmental Treaty - even though now 
it seems satisfied with the fact that four MEPs will be invited to the negotiations of the 
new Treaty, and the EP designated all members of the Spinelli Group, which gather 
politicians and opinion-makers in favour of a federal Europe. However, within the 
Parliament there are already discussions about different amendment proposals, mainly 
proposed by Andrew Duff, a liberal MEP, president of the parliamentary branch of the 
Spinelli Group and of the Union of European Federalists. One proposes an enlargement of 
the number of MEPs to create a Europe-wide constituency beside the national ones. 
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Another suggests to reform the Treaty amendment procedure, substituting the unanimity 
of the ratifications with a 4/5 majority. After the decision to draft a new intergovernmental 
Treaty was reached, Duff proposed a whole specific agenda for a new Convention. If 
adopted it would imply significant steps towards a European federal government for the 
economy, and an economic federation or a European federal democracy without military 
competences.  
 All these issues can be seen in the current debates and agendas of the European 
institution and in the inter-institutional dynamics. The European unification process shows 
that often the integrative proposals which were not approved at one time were then 
inserted later into the Treaties. Some scholars suggest for example that more than 80% of 
the 1984 Spinelli Draft Treaty has been incorporated into the Treaties (see Ponzano 2007 
and Bonvicini 2010), and the current debate relates to much of the rest. 
 It should be noted however that, even if the most advanced proposals were 
adopted, the EU would still be quite different from traditional federations. From this 
perspective the idea of the EU becoming a "supranational federal democracy" can help to 
conceptualise the differences and the similarities alike. These regard institutional and fiscal 
issues alike. 
 The MacDougall Report suggested that even a fully federalised EU, including 
monetary, economic and political union, assuming entirely the burden of defence, would 
require a budget of between 7% and 10% of GDP at the mostXVI, while existing federation 
usually have a budget of over 40% of GDP; the EU budget is currently 1% of GDP. The 
Member states have also pledged the equivalent of about 5% of GDP to the EFSF and the 
ESM. And their defence expenditure is about 1.6% of the EU GDP.  The current situation 
thus seems to confirm the estimates of the MacDougall Report. Therefore, the EU would 
be a much more decentralised federation than any existing one, requiring a much more 
limited budget. 
 From an institutional perspective, while all federations are characterised by a 
second Chamber representing the member states, nowhere is such an institution as 
powerful as in the EUXVII. The existence of the European Council on the one hand and of 
the several formations of the Council of Ministers on the other, is a clear indication of the 
role of member states government in the EU institutional system. Even the proposals to 
make the Council more similar to the conventional second chamber would only partially 
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transform, rather than diminish, the enormous role of member states government in the 
EU institutional architecture. For example, the Convention proposal of the Constitutional 
Treaty to significantly reduce the formations of the Council providing for a single General 
Affairs and Legislative Council, transformed into a fully-fledged second legislative 
chamber, and a Foreign Affairs Council. But the proposal, aimed at ensuring higher 
legislative coherence, did not impinge on the paramount role of the European Council for 
example. 
 Furthermore, the linguistic and cultural differences make the formation of a 
potential European national identity unlikely, and not just undesirable. This is what Beck 
and Grande with their vision of a cosmopolitan Europe have been pointing out. This does 
not imply however that a supranational and post-national federal democracy cannot be 
established. The current crisis is showing how interdependent Europeans are. How the 
problem of even a small state can soon and easily become a problem for the whole 
Eurozone. To establish a fully democratic system to manage this interdependence and 
provide the consequently required European public goods would probably be more 
acceptable than continuing to go through endless intergovernmental negotiations and 
meetings that have so far proved unable to cope with the crisis.  
 
 
  
Conclusions 
 
 I have tried to show that a long-term dynamic consideration of the European 
unification process highlights a quite consistent tendency towards the increase of European 
competences and powers. This trend has made the EU more and more similar to a 
federation, even if it is not (yet?) a fully-fledged federation.  
 I discounted the possibility that the EU may constitute a new model or ideal type 
because it lacks the stability required. An institutional setting remains stable if it is able to 
satisfy. to a reasonable degree, the expectation of citizens by handling the main problems. 
The crises of the last few years have clearly shown that, even after Lisbon, the EU lacks 
many essential instruments to cope with them, and could jeopardise its own greatest 
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achievements, such as the Euro. This fundamental tension is behind the debates about new 
instruments, i.e. new powers and decision-making procedures, which is going on within all 
European institutions. 
 The current crisis has spurred a debate and an agenda, which includes several 
proposals that would further strengthen the trend towards a progressive federalization of 
the EU. They may or may not be approved. But the markets seem to consider that, up to 
now, the various intergovernmental solutions to the sovereign debt crisis attempted have 
been insufficient. This may provide a strong incentive to turn towards a more 
supranational and federal approach.  
Indeed, the EU can be considered as the laboratory of a new federalism, precisely 
for being made up of nation-states with centuries-old stories and identities, unlike most 
other federations around the world (Pinder 2010). This forces the EU to identify new 
institutional avenues, to a certain extent more coherent with the federalist principles, and 
very respectful of subsidiarity. Within the EU a new kind of federal system is emerging. 
The current crisis is so structural and dangerous that the alternative between integration 
and fragmentation is more present than ever and brings back to mind Beveridge’s advice: 
the alternative for the European states and citizens may now well be "unite or perish". 
 
                                                 
* This paper constitutes a thoroughly revised version of the one presented in March 2011 at a workshop on 
"Treaty Reform Beyond Lisbon?" held at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European 
University Institute, jointly organised with the European Union Democracy Observatory, the Centre for 
Studies on Federalism, the Sant'Anna Legal Studies, and the Max Weber Program of the EUI. I would like to 
thank Bruno De Witte, Giuseppe Martinico, Antonio Padoa Schioppa and all other participants at that 
workshop for their insightful and fruitful comments and criticisms on that paper, which helped me 
significantly in its revision. In that paper "Why Constitutional Politics Will Continue" I claimed, contrary to 
the common wisdom at that time, that a new wave of institutional reform was approaching. As events have 
confirmed that claim, which would now look obvious, I took away that part. But I employ here the 
theoretical framework on which that claim was based, to support the main thesis of this paper, namely that 
steps towards a federal democracy are needed to overcome the current EU crisis. I just had the opportunity 
to present the revised paper at the Seminario de investigadores of the Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales in Madrid in January 2012 before submitting this final version. I would like to thank Ana 
Mar Fernández Pasarín, Mario Kölling, Hélder Ferreira do Vale, and all other participants at the seminar for 
the very interesting and useful discussion we had on the paper, which again helped me significantly in the 
final revision, up to this current form, for which I alone am responsible. 
I This attitude is rather widespread in the literature, also among scholars who have contributed significantly to 
the study of the EU. I will just mention as an example Mario Telò, whose analysis of the development of the 
EU is usually timely and insightful, even if the long-term effects foreseen after each new Treaty were not 
confirmed. Telò considers the Maastricht Treaty as a qualitative change, the first step and the start of a 
constitutional phase of European integration (1992, especially 85-88). In 1993 in a pioneering analysis of the 
European social-democratic parties he invites to study European parties and notices the inability of the 
functionalist dynamics to Europeanise parties. He then invites the social-democratic parties to take a more 
federalist stance, more coherent with the new constitutional phase of the process (1993, especially 30-35 and 
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46-50). Later on, in another pioneering book, when he launched the idea of new regionalism, he considers the 
Amsterdam Treaty as the end of the long evolutionary functionalist-federalist period and the come-back and 
the start of a new phase of intergovernmentalism, through the re-nationalization of part of the acquis (1998, 
especially 23, but see also 23-25). In just six years the European integration process would have changed 
phase twice. And other shifts would follow after each new Treaty.  
II A useful methodological analysis of this issue with regards to the whole of social sciences is offered by Elias 
(1987). 
III Beside these three schools of thought there are some theoretical precursors, not developed specifically in 
relation to the European integration process, which can only be mentioned here, i.e. transactionalism and 
functionalismIII developed by Karl Deutsch (1953) and David Mitrany (1933, 1963, and 1965) respectively. 
There are also other interesting strands of research, that have not yet developed a fully-fledged theory of the 
process as such, namely social constructivism (For an overview of social constructivist research about 
European integration see contributions published in "Journal of European Public Policy ', VI, no. 4, 1999, 
entirely devoted to this theme) - which stresses the role of ideas and social perceptions - and European 
constitutionalism (a useful overview of this vast literature is proposed by Martinico 2009, and the classic and 
fundamental contributions by Weiler 1999, and Mancini 2000) which highlights the fundamental role of the 
Court of Justice in the process. Considering the main focus of this paper an analysis of the neo-institutionalist 
scholarship could also have been undertaken. However, considering that the paper includes a normative 
conclusion, I have chosen to focus on the classic grand theories which share this approach of combining an 
analytical aspect with a normative one.  
IV Obviously, an old-fashioned conception of unitary and indivisible sovereignty underlies this kind of view. 
There follows that the possibility to give it up to European institutions is considered as an essentially zero-
sum game. 
V That crises provide occasions to advance European integration was often mentioned also by Monnet and 
Spinelli (1976; Spinelli 1979, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1992a, 1992b). 
VI A first sketch of this analytical scheme can be found in Albertini 1965 and 1966 with regard to the role of 
crises, in Albertini 1961, 1969, 1980 about the initiative role of the federalist organizations. I discussed it and 
tried to develop it further in Castaldi 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2010. 
VII On the basis of Triffin's studies (especially 1966, 1971) the federalists organizations considered the 
prospect of the collapse of Bretton Woods as a potential crisis that could open the way to the monetary 
union, and developed several studies on the various aspects of such a plan throughout the Seventies [see 
Iozzo and Mosconi 1969; Majocchi 1974; Montani 1974; Moro 1974; Velo 1974a, 1974b, and 1976; Jenkins 
and others 1978; Movimento Europeo e Movimento Federalista Europeo 1978] as recalled by Tommaso 
Padoa Schioppa (2002). 
VIII The failure of this attempt has contributed to bring scholars' attention away from it. A notable and useful 
exception is Preda's detailed studies (1990 and 1994). 
IX See especially Albertini 1985 and 1986, both now in 1999a, particularly pp. 275-276 and 290-292. This 
distinction, however, was referred to much earlier in Albertini 1963, now in 1999a pp. 66-71. I discussed this 
proposal with reference to the contemporary academic literature in Castaldi 2005 and 2010. 
X From a purely legal perspective Itzcovich (2005) analyses the concept of "legal integration" providing a 
useful review of the literature.  
XI The Commission’s power is much greater in a system in which its proposals can be approved by QMV and 
modified by unanimity, than in a system in which also the approval requires unanimity, and thus obliges the 
Commission to water down the proposals to gather a unanimous consensus. 
XII Also on the Court of Justice's role however, there was a scholarly debate between intergovernmentalists 
(Carrubba, Gabel, Hanka 2008) on the one hand, and  neo-functionalists and/or federalists on the other 
(Mancini 2000; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 2010; Stone Sweet 2012).  
XIII A consistent trend in this direction started after the Maastricht Treaty provided for a monetary union and 
the establishment of the European Central Bank. See among others: Hesse and Wright 1996; , McKay 1996, 
1999, 2001; Follesdal and Koslowski (eds.) 1998; Dobson and Follesdal (eds.) 2004; Nicolaidis and Howse 
(eds.) 2001; Filippov, Ordeshook, Shvetsova 2004; The Journal of European Public Policy, XII, 2005, no. 3, 
devoted to federalism and the EU; Fabbrini (ed.) 2005; Longo 2006, Hueglin and Fenna 2006; Finn 2010, 
Burgess and Pinder (eds), 2011. 
XIV In addition to Albertini's papers already mentioned, see Burgess 1986, 1989, 2000; Burgess and Gagnon 
(eds.) 1993, 2010; Burgess and Pinder 2011; Dosenrode 2007; Levi 1979, 1990;, Majocchi L.V. 1996; Montani 
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1999; Pinder 1984, 1985, 1986, 1993, 2002, 2010; Rossolillo 1975; Sidjanski 1992, 2001. 
XV I have analysed this issue in more details in Castaldi 2010. 
XVI Cfr. Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finances in European Integration, Vol. I, p. 70. The Report, 
delivered in 1977 is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter8/19770401en73macdougallrep
vol1.pdf. 
XVII For an overview of second chambers in federal systems cfr. J. Luther, P. Passaglia and R. Tarchi (eds.), A 
World of Second Chambers. Handbook for Constitutional Studies on Bicameralism, Giuffrè, Milan, 2006. 
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